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Michael P. Creedon, Esq.
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OPINION OF THE COURT

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
National Grange appeals the verdict that was entered against it following a bench
trial in this declaratory judgment action it filed to determine if it owed a duty to defend or
indemnify CRS Auto Parts pursuant to an insurance policy that it issued to CRS. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court’s verdict in favor of CRS.
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not reiterate the factual or procedural background except insofar as may be
helpful to our brief discussion.
After hearing all of the evidence offered at trial, the district court found that there
was no credible evidence that the insurance binder issued to CRS by Turley Insurance
Agency before CRS actually completed the formal application for the policy contained
misrepresentations on the part of CRS or any of its agents. Rather, the court concluded
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that National Grange had all pertinent information when it issued the binder through
Turley on June 30, 2003. Thus, the court found that the binder was in effect on July 10,
2003, the date of the accident underlying this declaratory action. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins.
v. CRS Auto Parts, Inc., 2007 WL 4078728 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 16, 2007).
When reviewing findings of fact, we accept the final determination of the
factfinder, unless that determination is either “(1) completely devoid of minimum
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396,
400 (3d Cir. 2008)(citing Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)). Our
review of the district court’s application of Pennsylvania law is plenary. See Kowalsky v.
Long Beach Twp., 72 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1995).
National Grange argues that the district court’s conclusion that the insurance
policy was void ab initio, and that the district court’s finding of no material
misrepresentation prior to issuance of the binder was clearly erroneous. We disagree.
II.
When attempting to void an insurance policy under Pennsylvania law, the insurer
must prove that: (1) the insured made a false representation; (2) the insured knew the
representation was false when it was made or the insured made the representation in bad
faith; and (3) the representation was material to the risk being insured. See Coolspring
Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,
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each of these three elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Batka
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 704 F.2d 684, 687 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Pennsylvania requires
that an insurer establish the defense of fraud in the application by ‘clear, precise and
indubitable’ evidence ... [and] that the factfinder be satisfied of the elements of the
defense by clear and convincing evidence.”) (citations omitted).
National Grange attempted to prove that CRS (or its agent) knowingly failed to
disclose: that Meridian/State Auto refused to renew CRS’s automobile coverage, that
CRS provided inaccurate loss reports, and that CRS was a subsidiary of another company.
However, the district court heard all of the testimony and found no evidence to
suggest that CRS made any misrepresentations. Nothing on this record justifies rejecting
that finding or overturning the verdict that was rendered pursuant to it. Moreover, even if
misrepresentations had been made by CRS, they were clearly not material to National
Grange’s decision to issue the policy because they could only have occurred after Turley
issued the binder of insurance. Thus the evidence simply did not support National
Grange’s attempt to have the policy declared void ab initio and the court correctly
concluded that National Grange had no right of recision. See Nat’l Grange, 2007 WL
4078728 at *2.
National Grange did not receive any paperwork from CRS until July 14, 2003.
Therefore, the only representations that could have been made before insurance was
“bound” would have to have been made to Turley Insurance Agency. Yet, Turley
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testified that he had all necessary information before he issued the binder.
It is not disputed that the Agency Agreement between Turley Insurance and CRS
was in effect when Turley issued the insurance binder. Thus, despite National Grange’s
protestations to the contrary, the district court correctly found that Turley was acting as
National Grange’s agent.
National Grange places substantial reliance on Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Co., 595
A.2d 1 (Pa. 1991), in arguing that an insurer can rescind a policy that was procured by
fraudulent misrepresentations that are material to the insured risk. Id. at 8. However, the
misrepresentations in Klopp occurred before the insurance company issued insurance.
Similarly, the court correctly concluded that any backdating of the signature on the
policy is also irrelevant since neither a timely and contemporaneous signature, nor a
completed insurance application was material to National Grange’s decision to insure
CRS.
III.
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the district
court.
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